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The Impact of Wealth on Subjective Well-Being: 
A Comparison of Three Welfare-State Regimes1
This study provides new insight on subjective well-being (hereafter SWB) and its associa­
tion with individuals’ objective economic standing. In particular, we are interested in 
how one’s relative position in the distribution o f wealth influences his or her general 
satisfaction with life (hereafter GLS), representing the cognitive and m ost stable dimen­
sion o f SWB. M ost studies on the relationship between economic standing and SWB have 
used income as an indicator o f  economic standing. Yet, income seems to account fo r  only 
a small part o f the variation in SWB (e.g. Diener, Sandvik, Seidlitz & Diener 1993). In 
addition, income is restricted to a certain time interval (income per week, per month, or 
per year) and, to periods o f  labor market activity. Recent studies thus argue that other 
measures o f economic standing such as socioeconomic status, deprivation, and wealth, 
might be more useful fo r  understanding its relationship with SWB (e.g. Christoph 2010). 
Wealth is a stock Graph accumulated throughout a person’s life course. Additionally, 
in contrast to earned income, which requires time, effort, and working ability, wealth 
offers access to capital and goods independent o f individual investment and ability, fo r  
example, through intergenerational transfers (Elmelech 2008). Wealth may also be a 
better indicator o f  an individual‘s long-term consumption potential (Spilerman 2000). 
Considering the unique properties o f wealth, we see it f i t  to measure the consequences 
o f economic standing to SWB, over and above the consequences income may have on it.
A  second contribution o f  this study is the focus it  places on macro-level factors, and 
specifically, state-level welfare systems. The relevance o f the welfare-state system to 
the relation between wealth and SWB is best explained through the concept o f  decom­
modification, referring to the extent to which citizens in a country are economically 
independent from  the market through the provision o f  social benefits. These benefits can 
be understood as a cushion against the consequences o f  shortage o f financial resources 
(Pacek & Radcliff 2008). Because the extent to which these benefits are provided by the 
welfare-state strongly differs between the three regimes, we predict that the association 
between wealth and SWB will also differ.
Linking wealth to SWB: 
Needs theory
Needs theory defines the relations between 
economic standing and SWB through the 
function of economic standing and mostly 
incom e, in providing individuals' needs 
(Diener & Biswas-Diener 2002). In gen­
eral, needs theory assumes that individual 
income, as a principal indicator of economic 
standing, augments individual SWB primar­
ily because income enables people to better 
provide for their needs.2 The main premise 
of needs theory is that low income implies 
a disadvantage in SWB while high income 
leads only to a small advantage (Maslow 
1943, 1954), if any (Veenhoven & Ouwe- 
neel 1995; Veenhoven 1993). Importantly, 
in this study we move away from the typi­
cal understanding of economic standing as 
represented by incom e, and investigate 
a different form  of econom ic w ell-being 
namely, wealth.
In order to test for the empirical validity 
of the needs-based mechanism our models 
not only control for the position of the 
respondents in the wealth distribution. They 
additionally include a subjective measure 
for economic hardship - that is, individuals'
self-reported responses about having “prob­
lems to make ends m eet.” If the relevant 
m echanism  behind the relation of wealth 
w ith SWB is the fulfillment o f basic needs, 
then we would expect subjective economic 
hardship to mediate the supposed negative 
effect o f being poor on SWB.
The comparative setting: 
Do different contexts imply 
differences in the wealth-SWB 
relation?
One im portant aim of our study is to inves­
tigate the contribution of the welfare-state 
system, operationalized through the concept 
of decommodification, to the wealth-SWB 
relation. Decom m odification, determ ines 
w hether personal w ealth  is necessary for 
individuals in order to m aintain their SWB 
or not, and w hat is the level of w ealth  
required to do so. Given our focus on the 
relation between w ealth and SWB among 
aging individuals who are either close to 
retirem ent or already retired, we dem on­
strate the workings o f decomm odification 
referring to state pension systems. State 
pension systems intervene in individuals' 
saving behavior by taking over the task of
old-age provision through m andatory sav­
ing. Moreover, the level of minimum pen­
sion benefits provided is likely to affect the 
intensity of the wealth SWB relation among 
those individuals who did not have the pos­
sibility to choose how much they are willing 
to save namely, the poor.
In order to pu t these predictions to an 
empirical test we compare three countries, 
each representing a different welfare-state 
system complying w ith a different regime 
type, specified in Esping-Andersen‘s typol­
ogy (1990, 1999). The social-dem ocratic 
w elfare-state represented in our study by 
Sweden, secures its citizens the highest 
level of decommodification, w ith relatively 
generous public pensions (OECD 2011a). 
The relative minim um pension benefits as 
percentage of average earnings have been 
at 25% in 2008 (OECD, 2011a). In Sweden 
therefore, persons are less dependent on 
their income for old-age provision. Under 
such conditions, the wealth-SWB relation is 
predicted to be comparatively weak. In the 
liberal model, represented in this study by 
Israel, the general decommodification level 
is low and accordingly, public pensions 
are relatively prudent. Old-age allowance 
in Israel, w hich is universally distributed, 
is insufficient even for a m inim al living 
standard (Dagan-Busaglo 2007), w ith m ini­
m um pension benefits at a level of 13% of 
average earnings in 2008 (OECD 2011b). 
Under these conditions w ealth is expected 
to be a necessary instrum ent to secure SWB 
in old age and the wealth-SWB relation is 
therefore expected to be rather strong. In the 
conservative w elfare-state, represented in 
our study by Germany, the level of decom­
m odification is interm ediate. The German 
system does not have a general minimum 
retirem ent pension. However, individuals 
w ithout m andatory  and personal savings 
are eligible for basic social security  in 
retirement, w hich equals the standard rate 
of the basic support for employment seekers 
(Hartz 4) that was 21% of average earnings 
in 2008 (OECD 2011b). The conservative 
model thus suggests a relation of medium 
strength betw een w ealth  and SWB. From 
our theoretical considerations, we derive 
the following hypotheses:
H1: Income and w ealth together account 
for the variance in GLS better than  
does income alone.
H2: Individuals of poor wealth have lower 
GLS than do those in the middle of the 
wealth distribution. The w ealthy group
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has only slightly higher, or the same, 
GLS than  does the middle group.
H3: The negative effect of poor wealth on 
GLS is strongest in Israel. It will be 
weaker in Germany, and sim ilar or 
slightly weaker in Sweden.
H4: The negative effect of poor wealth on 
GLS is mediated by individuals' sub­
jective feelings about their respective 
economic hardship.
Data, Variables, Hypotheses & 
Methods
For our em pirical analyses we make 
use of the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) that is an 
in ternational, representative panel study 
of the population aged 50 years and over. 
Observing individuals aged 50 or more, we 
analyse the consequences o f differential 
wealth levels, measured as household gross 
wealth on their GLS. In order to account for 
the socio-economic and socio-demographic 
factors tha t affect GLS, we apply a linear 
regression model (OLS regression) w ith 
the H uber-W hite Sandwich estim ator for 
cluster sam pling (individuals clustered in 
households) that provides robust standard 
error estimates. The analyses are carried out 
separately for each of the three countries.
General life satisfaction  w as m easured 
using an 11-point single item scale which 
we standardized to have a mean o f zero 
and a standard deviation of one to enable 
international comparison.3 Consequentially, 
a one-unit change in one of the indepen­
dent variables results in a change in GLS of 
one standard deviation. Income and wealth 
are measured on the household level and 
presented in Euro, adjusted for purchasing 
power parity. We operationalize income as 
to tal net annual income, divided by the 
root o f the num ber o f persons living in a 
household. Wealth was measured by positive 
(gross) wealth, while controlling for house­
hold debt (negative wealth).4
Following our theoretical considerations, 
the effect o f w ealth on SWB is expected to 
differ depending on an individual‘s, respec­
tively a household‘s position in a country's 
w ealth distribution. We account for three 
main positions: The two middle quartiles 
represent the middle category (hereinafter, 
“middle w ealth” or the “middle group”), 
w hich serves as the reference category. 
Those in the highest quartile are hereinafter 
referred to as the “w ealthy” or as being of 
“high wealth.” Those in the lowest quartile 
are hereinafter referred to as the „poor“ or 
as „being of poor w ealth“.
Subjective economic hardship is captured by 
respondents' self-evaluation of their ability 
to “make ends m eet” in their household.
Originally, responses range from 1 (“w ith 
great difficulty”) to 4 (“easily”). We combined 
the responses of 1 and 2 to create a dummy 
variable representing people w ith economic 
hardship. Following previous research (Die­
ner, Suh, Lucas, & Smith 1999), we control 
in our models for the respondents' labor 
market outcomes, measured through their 
educational attainm ent, their labor market 
status and their household income. We also 
control for fam ily characteristics (marital 
status and children); im m igrant status (in 
Israel, we also control for Arab origin due 
to the unique position o f this m inority in 
the Israeli stratification system); and health.
Results
Descriptive results
Graph 1 shows the mean values of GLS by 
country and w ealth  group. The predictors 
were w eighted (calibrated cross sectional 
weights) in order to reduce problems of 
un it non-response and sam ple a ttrition  
(Mannheim Research Institute for the Eco­
nomics of Aging 2010: 43). As can be seen, 
the Swedish respondents report the highest 
m ean values o f GLS, while Israelis report 
the lowest. Mean (in blue) and median (in 
orange) levels o f household w ealth  are 
illustrated in Graph 2. It is highest in Israel, 
lower in Sweden, and lowest in Germany. 
Country differences in mean GLS and aver-
age household w ealth are statistically sig­
nificant at the 0.01 level. Graph 3 illustrates 
mean and median debts. Compared w ith the 
Israeli and German respondents, the Swed­
ish respondents are the most indebted. In 
Germany and Israel, the median value is 0, 
suggesting that 50% of German and Israeli 
respondents are not in debt at all. Here too, 
mean differences were statistically signifi­
cant at the 0.01 level.
Graph 4 below further indicates that over 
h a lf o f the respondents in Israel report 
problems making ends meet. This statistic 
increases to almost 75% am ong poor Israe­
lis, and decreases to about 22% am ong 
w ealthy Israelis reporting to possess gross 
w ealth between €575,000 and €7,670,000. 
Considering that the poor in Germany pos­
sess the lowest mean gross wealth, and that 
the w ealthy in Israel possess the highest 
mean gross wealth (see Graph 1 above) this 
finding is particularly interesting.
Table 1 shows the results of our m ultivari­
ate regression models. For reasons of clarity 
we only report those measures and coef­
ficients that are relevant for the hypotheses.5 
The first hypothesis states that wealth and 
income together should account for the GLS 
of the respondents better than does income 
alone. The findings (Model 2) indeed show 
that controlling for income, wealth has an 
impact on GLS in Germany and Israel, w ith
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the poor reporting lower GLS than house­
holds in the middle of the w ealth distribu­
tion and the rich reporting higher GLS. Debt 
is significantly associated w ith SWB only 
am ong the Israeli respondents, where debt 
is found to slightly decrease their GLS. The 
R2 of Models 1 and 2 indicate that income 
and wealth, w hen taken together, explain 
a greater part of the variance in SWB than 
does income alone. The increase in R2 is 
significant at the one per cent level in Ger­
m any and at the five per cent level in Israel 
(F-test). Hypothesis 1 is thus supported by 
our analysis fo r  Germany and Israel.
In Model 2 we further test hypothesis 2, 
w hich following the needs theory predicts 
tha t the gap in SWB between the middle 
group and the poor will be greater than  
the gap between the middle group and the 
w ealthy. The regression model conveys 
that in both Germany and Israel, the poor 
penalty and the wealth prem ium are similar 
in magnitude. In Sweden, the GLS of both 
the poor and the w ealthy are not signifi­
cantly different from the GLS of their middle 
w ealth counterparts. Hypothesis 2 is thus 
not supported by the SHARE data.
Hypothesis 3, proposes tha t the negative 
effect of being of poor w ealth on GLS will 
be strongest in Israel, and weaker in Ger­
m any and Sweden. The findings in Model 
2 indicate tha t in Sweden individuals of 
poor w ealth do not differ significantly in 
their GLS compared w ith individuals in the 
middle of the w ealth distribution. Regard­
ing the size of the poor effects on GLS in 
Germany and Israel, interaction based coef­
ficients provide some evidence that being 
poor is more detrim ental for GLS in Israel 
than  in Germany. However, this difference 
is not statistically significant. Hypothesis 3 
is thus not supported by the data.
Graph 3 Household debts by country and wealth group
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Model 3 finally tests hypothesis 4, w hich 
suggests that the effect o f poor w ealth on 
GLS will be m ediated by an individual's 
subjective sense of economic hardship. The 
findings presented in Model 3 indicate that 
respondents who report having problems 
making ends meet are significantly less sat­
isfied w ith their life compared to those who 
do not have problems. Furthermore, Model 
3 dem onstrates tha t the poor penalty  we
found in Germany and in Israel diminishes 
after this subjective measure o f economic 
hardship is introduced. In Germany, the 
rem aining effect is no longer statistically 
significant implying full mediation, but in 
Israel it remains significant, implying only 
partial mediation. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is 
supported by the data fo r  Germany, but only 
partially supported by the data fo r  Israel.
Table 1 OLS regression predicting general life satisfaction
M1: only income M2: income, debts, wealth M3: income, debts, wealth, ec. hardship
DE IL SE DE IL SE DE IL SE
Log(Income) 0.07 ** 0.06 * 0.05 * 0.05 * 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03
Log(Debts) 0.00 -0.01 ** 0.00 0.00 -0.01 * 0.00
Poor -0.13 * -0.24 ** -0.07 0.07 -0.17 * -0.03
Rich 0.11 * 0.17 * 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.07
Ec. hardship -0.46 *** -0.34 *** -0.24 ***
Df 12 13 12 15 16 15 16 17 16
R2 0.207 0.276 0.118 0.212 0.296 0.120 0.244 0.314 0.127
N 2,390 1,849 2,572 2,390 1,849 2,572 2,390 1,849 2,572
W e  c o n t r o l l e d  f o r  g e n d e r ,  h o u s e h o l d  s i ze ,  a g e ,  m i g r a n t  s t a t u s ,  A r a b  o r i g i n  (IL), m a r r i e d ,  c h i l d ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  e m p l o y e d ,  u n e m p l o y e d ,  h o m e m a k e r  a n d  h e a l t h .  A l l  
a n a l y s e s  b a s e d  o n  5  s e ts  o f  i m p u t a t i o n s  ( u s i n g  t h e  ' m i m ' - p r e f i x  c o m m a n d  in S t a t a  12).  See  H o c h m a n  &  S k o p e k  ( 2 0 1 3 )  f o r  f u l l  m o d e l s  a n d  d e t a i l s .  
* p < 0 . 0 5 ,  * * p < 0 . 0 1 ,  * * * p < 0 . 0 0 1 .




Seite 8 ISI 56 - August 2016
Conclusions
Needs theory claims that wealth augments 
SWB by enabling a person to better provide 
for his or her basic needs, economic and/ 
or recreational. This proposition implies 
that the poor will most likely enjoy a lower 
level of SWB compared to the middle wealth 
group, while the wealthy will differ from the 
middle wealth group only slightly, if at all. 
Our findings show that net of income, gross 
household wealth has a significant impact 
on SWB, measured as GLS, in Germany and 
Israel. More specifically, we find a poor pen­
alty and a rich premium on GLS in these two 
countries. Against the predictions o f needs 
theory the two coefficients do not differ in 
magnitude, suggesting that wealth can buy 
happiness. In Sweden, neither the poor nor 
the w ealthy differ significantly in their SWB 
from the middle w ealth group.
Our study contributes to the contem porary 
literature on SWB by dem onstrating that: 
1) the SWB of individuals aged 50 or older, 
is strongly associated w ith wealth, repre­
senting an im portant source for economic 
standing, in Germany and Israel, yet, not 
in Sweden; 2) needs are the predom inant 
m echanism  linking economic standing to 
SWB in Germany, and they also partially  
explain the wealth - SWB relations in Israel; 
and 3) the degree of social support provided 
by the state has an impact on the m agni­
tude of the association between wealth and 
SWB. Our study might thus serve as a fertile 
ground for the on-going debate on whether 
and how w elfare policy instrum ents can 
improve a population's SWB.
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Abwärtsmobilität beim Haushaltseinkommen ohne 
angfristigen Einfluss auf die Lebenszufriedenheit
Der Frage der Verringerung der Einkommensungleichheit kom mt seit jeher in der sozi- 
alwissenschajtlichen Forschung eine große Bedeutung zu. Im plizit wird dabei davon 
ausgegangen, dass eine stärkere Einkommensgleichheit auch zu  einer zufriedeneren 
Gesellschaft führt. Einkommensmobilität ermöglicht einen solchen Wandel in der 
Einkommensverteilung, da dadurch jeder Mensch die Möglichkeit in Aussicht hat, seine 
ökonomisch bedingte Position in der Gesellschaft positiv zu verändern. Z ieht man nicht 
die absoluten Einkommen, sondern die relative Einkommensposition in Betracht, muss 
jedoch fü r  jeden Menschen, der aus einer ökonomisch benachteiligten Position aufsteigt, 
ein anderer Mensch ökonomisch absteigen. Einkommensmobilität kann zudem auch 
bedeuten, dass Personen in bereits benachteiligten ökonomischen Positionen noch weiter 
absteigen. Es ist dementsprechend wichtig zu  betrachten, welche individuellen A usw ir­
kungen der ökonomische Abstieg a u f die Lebenszufriedenheit eines Menschen hervorruft. 
Die Frage nach der Bedeutung von Abwärtsmobilität fü r  die Lebenszufriedenheit wurde 
zudem unlängst durch eine von Hadjar und Samuel (2015) durchgeführte Studie erneut 
relevant, welche zu dem überraschenden Schluss kommt, dass intragenerationale beruf­
liche Abwärtsmobilität zu keiner Veränderung in der Lebenszufriedenheit der Befrag­
ten führt. Kann dieses Ergebnis m it Blick a u f Einkommensmobilität bestätigt werden? 
Darüber hinaus soll ein weiterführender A spekt betrachtet werden. Zur Identifikation 
von sozialem Wandel ist von Interesse, ob sich die Auswirkungen über Geburtskohorten 
hinweg verändert haben, da jüngere Geburtsjahrgänge unter zunehmend besseren mate­
riellen und physischen Bedingungen aufwachsen.
Die nach fo lgend  vorges te llte  A nalyse 
beschäftigt sich mit zwei Fragestellungen:
■ Wie verändert sich die Lebenszufrieden­
heit bei Abwärtsmobilität in der relativen 
Einkommensposition?
■ Lassen sich Unterschiede in der Abfolge 
von Geburtskohorten finden?
Die Lebenszufriedenheit stellt eine über­
greifende Bewertung der eigenen Lebens­
bedingungen dar. Als erklärender Faktor für 
die Lebenszufriedenheit wird der ökonomi­
sche Statusverlust untersucht. Unter dem 
ökonomischen Status w ird die Position in 
der E inkom m ensverteilung in R elation 
zu der Position A nderer verstanden. Der 
Wechsel zwischen den einzelnen Positio­
nen innerhalb der Einkom menshierarchie 
beschreibt folglich die Einkommensmobili­
tät und der Abstieg zwischen den Positionen 
die abwärtsgerichtete Einkommensmobilität 
bzw. den ökonom ischen S tatusverlust. 
Damit grenzt sich das Konzept von  Ver­
änderungen im absoluten Einkommen ab, 
da n icht V eränderungen im Einkom men
betrachtet werden, sondern die Veränderung 
der sogenannten relativen Einkommenspo­
sition eines Individuum s. Im M ittelpunkt 
dieser U ntersuchung stehen speziell jene 
V eränderungen im ökonom ischen Status, 
die ein Individuum  über seinen Lebens­
la u f  h inw eg  erfäh rt, die so g en an n te  
in tragenerationale Einkom m ensm obilität. 
Einkom mensm obilität w ird zumeist durch 
V eränderungen  im  Erw erbseinkom m en 
oder durch den Ein- bzw. A ustritt aus der 
Erwerbstätigkeit verursacht, aber auch Ver­
änderungen in der H aushaltsstruktur (wie 
z.B. der Ein- oder Auszug, der Tod oder die 
Geburt eines Haushaltsmitgliedes) können 
zu Einkommensmobilität führen (Schäfer et 
al. 2013). Die Ursachen für die Einkommens- 
abwärtsm obilität der Befragten werden im 
folgenden Beitrag allerdings nicht berück­
sichtigt.
Die A nalyse erfolgt m it den D aten des 
Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP), einer 
seit 1984 jäh rlich  durchgeführten reprä­
sentativen Panelstudie, die sich besonders 
au f die A nalyse von Einkom m ens- und
Berufsverläufen konzen triert1. Die letzte 
zum Zeitpunkt der Analyse zur Verfügung 
stehende Welle des SOEP ist aus dem Jahr 
2013, so dass Daten aus insgesamt 30 Befra­
gungsw ellen un tersucht w erden können. 
Unter 20-jährige Befragte w urden aus der 
Analyse ausgeschlossen, da Personen in 
dieser A ltersgruppe häufig noch bei den 
Eltern w ohnen und keine klaren Aussagen 
zum  ökonomischen Status getroffen w er­
den können. Das erste Befragungsjahr jedes 
Befragten wurde ebenfalls ausgeschlossen, 
da die E inkom m ensangaben hier häufig 
ungenau sind (Frick et al. 2006). Zudem 
werden Befragte mit maximal einem Befra­
gungszeitpunkt (nach Exklusion der Erstbe­
fragung) von der Analyse ausgeschlossen, 
da in diesem Fall keine Einkommensmobi­
lität festgestellt werden kann.
Die Lebenszufriedenheit wird über die Frage 
gemessen: „Wie zufrieden sind Sie gegen­
wärtig, alles in allem, mit Ihrem Leben?“. 
Beim Einkommen wird au f das jährliche, 
inflationsbereinigte und bedarfsgewichtete 
H aushaltsnettoeinkom m en zurückgegrif­
fen2. Das Einkommen aller Befragten zu 
jedem  der Befragungsjahre wird in Quintile 
eingeteilt und  jeder Befragte w ird einem 
der Quintile zugeordnet. Der Vorgang der 
Einkommensmobilität wird somit über den 
Positionswechsel der Befragten zwischen 
den Quintilen in konsekutiven Befragungs­
jahren gemessen3. Die Wahl dieses Einkom­
m ensm obilitätskonzeptes begründet sich 
insbesondere darin, dass die relative Ein­
kommensposition jedes Einzelnen im Falle 
gleichverteilter Einkommensveränderungen 
aller invariant bleibt. Dabei beschreibt das 
erste Quintil das un terste  Einkom m ens- 
quintil und das fünfte Quintil das oberste 
Einkommensquintil. Ein Abstieg zwischen 
den Einkommensquintilen wird folglich als 
Abwärtsmobilität interpretiert.
Abstieg zumeist nur um ein 
Einkommensquintil
Der ökonomische Abstieg eines Haushalts 
kann als Verlust einer vom  Menschen w ert­
